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I. Introduction 
In late 2002, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs introduced regular auctions of 
economic derivatives.  These options allow market participants to take positions on a variety of 
official macroeconomic measures, in anticipation of their scheduled announcement.  The 
statistics covered to date include U.S. Nonfarm Payrolls, Initial Jobless Claims, the Institute for 
Supply Management’s manufacturing index, the U.S. Retail Report, and the Eurozone Index of 
Consumer Prices.   
The auctions are conducted using a Pari-mutuel Derivatives Call Auction (PDCA) 
technology developed by Longitude, Inc.  The auctions last for between one to two hours and are 
typically held the day of or one day prior to the actual data release.  While the auction is in 
progress, investors can enter limit orders to buy or sell digital or vanilla options.  The digital 
options offer a $1 payout per contract if the actual release is at or above (for calls) or below (for 
puts) the strike, while vanilla options offer a payout of $1 per point the actual release is above or 
below the strike.  The available strikes for each auction are determined in advance by the auction 
sponsors (Deutsche Band and Goldman Sachs).  The available strikes center around economist 
consensus estimates and express a range of possible outcomes for the announced figure.      
Using the limit orders received during the auction, the PDCA technology calculates a 
unique equilibrium price for the various options that will 1) maximize the premiums collected 
and 2) ensure that the premiums collected will equal the total amount to be paid out for any given 
actual release number.1  The equilibrium price of each digital option gives an indication of the 
subjective probability the market assigns to that particular option expiring in the money and, 
                                                 
1 The process by which this unique equilibrium price is calculated is outside the scope of this paper, but is explained 
in detail by Baron and Lange. 
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thus, gives insight into what the market expects the announced figure to be.  This figure is called 
the implied forecast.   
As the auction proceeds, auction participants have access to real time information 
displaying indicative prices and implied forecasts (final prices and implied forecasts are not 
displayed until the auction has concluded).  These figures are updated as the auction proceeds to 
reflect incoming orders.  For example, if an auction participant expects (with high probability) 
that the released number will be higher than the current implied forecast, s/he may place an order 
for a digital call option with a strike at or near the current implied forecast.  If this order is placed 
at or above the current indicative price, it will result in an upward adjustment of the implied 
probabilities above the strike and a downward adjustment of the implied probabilities of 
outcomes below the strike.  As a result, the implied forecast will increase, expressing the revised 
view of the market taking the latest order into account.  Deutsche Bank makes available on its 
economic derivatives website (www.economicderivatives.com) post auction reports which 
summarize each auction and the final implied forecast.  Appendix I contains some examples of 
these post auction reports.   
Experience with other predictive markets, such as the Iowa Electronic Markets, suggests 
that the implied forecasts generated by these auctions may prove to be accurate predictors of the 
officially announced statistics.2  In this paper, I examine the efficacy of the economic derivatives 
market in predicting the announced numbers, particularly in comparison to economists’ 
consensus predictions.  Specifically, I examine the following four research questions:   
1) Do the auctions generate more accurate predictions than those of economists, measured 
on an absolute basis? 
                                                 
2 See Berg, Forsyth, Nelson and Rietz (2001) 
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2) If the auction predictions are not more accurate on an absolute basis, are they useful 
indicators of the surprise in a forthcoming announcement?  
3) Do the auctions generate forecasts which are more or less biased than those of 
economists? and 
4) Have the auction predictions improved over time? 
Unfortunately, given the short span of time the economic derivative markets have been in 
existence, there is limited data available and it is difficult to reach conclusions with a high degree 
of statistical significance.  My analysis of the data suggests that the auction forecasts are no 
better at predicting the actual announcements than economist consensus forecasts.  Nor are they 
useful as indicators of the direction of any potential surprise.  Both processes produced forecasts 
which were, on average, about 0.57 standard deviations from the actual announced figure.  
However, there does appear to be an interesting result relating to the degree of upward bias in the 
two types of forecasts.  While the auction and economist forecasts both tended to be overly 
optimistic, the auction forecasts appear to be less so. 
II. Data 
Data were collected from 56 auctions, held over the period October 2002 to March 2004 
and pertain to 49 actual announcements of the following measures:  ISM Manufacturing, 
Nonfarm Payrolls, and Retail Sales.3  There were seven Nonfarm Payroll announcements for 
which auctions were held both on the day of and day prior to the announcement, resulting in the 
difference between the number of announcements and the number of auctions.  An additional 22 
auctions, covering a European inflation measure, were not included because of difficulty in 
obtaining economist consensus estimates for those announcements.  Economist consensus 
                                                 
3 Auctions covering Initial Jobless Claims were introduced in February 2004.  However, because there have only 
been three auctions on this measure to date, these auctions were not included in this study.   
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estimates of the remaining three measures were collected from the Bloomberg terminal, as 
displayed on the day of the auction.  Bloomberg surveys about 50 to 60 economists on a regular 
basis and reports the resulting median estimate as the consensus forecast.  The actual announced 
statistic (not including any post-announcement revisions) was also collected from the Bloomberg 
terminal.  Table 1 summarizes the available data.  A full listing of the source data used in this 
analysis is contained in Appendix II. 
Table 1:  Summary Descriptive Statistics  
  Observations Mean St. Dev.
Announcements       
ISM Manufacturing 15 53.19 5.78
Retail Sales 16 0.37 0.63
Nonfarm Payroll 18 -17.78 104.15
Auction Forecasts       
ISM Manufacturing 15 53.23 5.08
Retail Sales 16 0.30 0.29
Nonfarm Payroll 25 46.06 85.98
Economist Forecasts       
ISM Manufacturing 15 53.52 4.91
Retail Sales 16 0.34 0.20
Nonfarm Payroll 18 38.28 70.14
Units:  ISM Manufacturing - Index 0-100; Retail Sales - % Monthly 
Change; Nonfarm Payroll - Monthly Change in Thousands 
The 56 observations cover announcements of economic statistics that are measured in 
very different ways.  The ISM number is an index, the Retail Sales figure is a percentage change, 
and the Nonfarm Payroll is an absolute change.  Accordingly, the data must first be standardized 
to allow for meaningful comparison.  The relevant statistics of interest, for each of the 56 
observations, are the magnitudes of the Auction Forecast Errors and Consensus Forecast Errors 
relative to the variation of the underlying statistic.  The Forecast Errors were obtained by 
subtracting the actual announced statistic from the auction’s implied forecast or the economist 
consensus forecast, respectively.  The Forecast Errors were then standardized by dividing the 
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Forecast Error by the standard deviation of the announced statistic between October 2002 and 
March 2003.4   
III. Accuracy of the Predictions 
The accuracy of the forecasts generated by the auctions and the economist surveys can be 
assessed by comparing the absolute values of the Standardized Errors for each observation.  The 
one-sided research hypothesis to be tested is that the mean absolute error generated by the 
auction process is less than the mean absolute error generated by economist surveys.  The null 
hypothesis, therefore, is that the mean absolute error generated by the auction is equal to (or 
greater than) that generated by the survey.  As can be seen from the paired t-test results 
summarized in Table 2, this null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  Both processes produce mean 
absolute errors about 0.57 standard deviations from the announced statistic.   
Table 2: Paired T-Test Comparing Mean Absolute Auction Forecast 
Error with Mean Absolute Consensus Forecast Error 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error of Mean 
Auction  56 0.57 0.53 0.07 
Consensus  56 0.57 0.54 0.07 
Difference 56 -0.00 0.19 0.03 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs > 0):  T-Value = -0.05 P-Value = 0.519 
 
Similar results are obtained when this test is conducted separately for each economic 
statistic.  The auction and consensus forecasts each generated mean absolute errors of about 0.21 
for ISM releases, 0.76 for Nonfarm Payroll releases, and 0.62 for Retail Sales releases.   
IV. Predictions of the Surprise 
Although the auction forecasts do not appear from these data to provide a more accurate 
prediction of the announced statistics than consensus forecasts, an interesting question is whether 
the auctions provide an indication of the direction of the surprise element contained in the 
                                                 
4 This method of standardization follows that used by Balduzzi et al. (2001) and  Andersen et al (2003) to measure 
the surprise element in macroeconomic news announcements. 
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announcement.  The surprise element is typically measured as the difference between the 
announced figure and the consensus estimate.  If the auction forecast tended to be above (below) 
the consensus estimate whenever the actual figure was also above (below) the consensus figure, 
the auction could prove to be an important indicator of the direction of the coming surprise, if not 
the magnitude.  However, it turned out that the auction accurately predicted the sign of the 
surprise for only 31 of the 56 auctions, in line with what would be expected to occur by random 
chance.  As is the case with the accuracy of predictions, this result is consistent across all types 
of data releases. 
The practice of measuring the surprise element in a news announcement in this fashion 
(i.e., as the difference between the announced figure and the consensus estimate) has been the 
norm in large part because there has been no other way to measure the market’s expectation for 
the announced figure.  For this reason, much of the research measuring the impact of news 
announcements on financial markets (e.g., Balduzzi et al. (2001) on bond markets and Andersen 
et al. (2003) on foreign exchange markets) measures the correlation between the market reaction 
and the surprise as measured by economist forecasts.  However, the introduction of the economic 
derivative auctions presents an alternative measure of market expectations.  It may be interesting 
to revisit the work of Balduzzi et al. and Andersen et al., measuring the surprise component as 
the difference between the auction forecast and the announced figure and see whether this 
measure of surprise does a better or worse job of predicting the actual market impact of the news 
announcement.  Such a question is beyond the scope of this paper, but is highlighted as a 
potential area for future research.   
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V. Bias in the Predictions 
In a study of the accuracy of economists’ consensus estimates for major monthly news 
announcement, Moersch (2001) concluded that, although the forecasts tended to be fairly 
accurate, they frequently contained an element of upward bias.  Moersch finds this to be 
consistent with earlier studies of long-term forecasts, which attribute bias to strategic behavior of 
forecasters such as a reluctance to adjust predictions in light of new information for fear that 
sharp adjustments might call into question a forecaster’s original estimates and damage his/her 
standing with clients.5   
Bias is evident in a given forecasting process to the extent that the mean forecast errors 
deviate from zero.  Figures 1 and 2, shown below, contain histograms and descriptive statistics 
of the standardized forecast errors generated by the auctions and by the economists’ estimates, 
respectively. 
Figure 1: Standardized Auction Forecast Errors 
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5 See, e.g., Laster et al. (1999) and Ehrback and Waldmann (1996)  
 Figure 2: Standardized Consensus Forecast Errors 
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At first glance both distributions appear centered near zero, as would be expected.  
However, the consensus forecast errors demonstrate a more pronounced skew to the right than 
the auction forecast errors (skewness measures of 0.93 and 0.84, respectively).  In addition, the 
mean forecast error generated by the auction process is nearly 25% closer to zero than that 
generated by the consensus estimates.  The 95% confidence intervals for the true mean forecast 
errors generated under each process allow one to conclude that the consensus predictions are 
upwardly biased (i.e., significantly greater than zero), but the same cannot be said for the auction 
(because the confidence interval includes zero).   
A more rigorous test of whether the auction forecast errors are systematically less 
optimistic than the consensus estimates can be conducted using a paired t-test.  Such a test, 
summarized in Table 3, below, is borderline significant at the 5% level.  Although the auctions 
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may result in less of an upward bias, further data would need to be examined in order make a 
conclusive determination.   
Table 3: Paired T-Test Comparing the Mean Auction Forecast Error 
with the Mean Consensus Forecast Error 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error of Mean 
Auction  56 0.17 0.76 0.10 
Consensus  56 0.21 0.77 0.10 
Difference 56 -0.04 0.19 0.03 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs < 0):  T-Value = -1.77 P-Value = 0.041 
Interestingly, similar analyses conducted for each of the three types of data 
announcements reveal varied distribution patterns for each type of announcement.  Neither the 
consensus estimates nor the auction predictions for ISM announcements generate mean forecast 
errors significantly different from zero, but a test of whether the auction forecasts are less 
pessimistic than consensus estimates is significant at the 5% level.  Mean forecast errors for 
Retail Sales announcements were also not significantly different from zero (for either process) 
and, for these announcements, a test of whether the auctions were more pessimistic was not quite 
significant at the 5% level.  Payroll forecast errors, on the other hand, were significantly greater 
than zero for both processes, but the auction and consensus estimates were both equally 
optimistic. 
VI. Improvement over Time 
The final question to be addressed is whether auction participants “learn” from prior 
auctions with the result that, over time, the auction forecasts do a better job of predicting the 
announcements.  To address this question, I first examined a plot of the auction forecast errors 
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against a chronological ordering of the auctions (shown below in Figure 3) to determine if there 
was a pattern over time.6 
Figure 3: Time series plot of auction forecast errors 
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If the forecasts are becoming more accurate over time, there should be a reduction in the 
variance in auction forecast errors for later auctions.  To test whether this is the case, I divided 
the auctions into two groups – the earlier half and the later half – and conducted a variance ratio 
test to determine whether the two groups exhibit non-constant variance.  The F-statistic for this 
test is 2.307 with a tail probability of 0.047, suggesting that the variance may be decreasing over 
time.  To determine whether this result holds for auction forecasts of all three economic 
measures, I repeated the test for ISM auctions, Nonfarm Payroll auctions, and Retail Sales 
                                                 
6 Note that, for the seven Nonfarm payroll announcements with two associated auctions, I used only the earlier of 
the two auctions in this analysis, as the earlier auction forecasts are more directly comparable with the 
announcements for which there was only one auction. 
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auctions separately.  It appears that the overall reduction in variance is driven solely by a 
reduction in the variance of Retail Sales forecast errors. 
To further analyze the improvement over time, I conducted a regression to see whether 
the absolute value of the standardized auction forecast error is related to the chronological 
auction number, using the equation tError t  )( , where t = the chronological auction 
number.  This analysis was conducted for the combined sample and for each of the individual 
types of announcements.  The regressions were not significant for the combined sample or for 
the ISM and Nonfarm Payroll auctions, yielding F-statistics ranging from 0.03 to 0.61 (with 
associated tail probabilities of 0.87 to 0.44).  Once again, however, Retail Sales auctions did 
demonstrate improvement.  The regression for Retail Sales provided the results summarized in 
Table 4, below.  For Retail Sales, it appears that each new auction is associated with a reduction 
in the absolute value of the forecast error of about 0.05 standard deviations.   
Table 4: Regression of Retail Sales Absolute Forecast Errors vs Auction Number 
 Coefficient 
Standard Error 
of Coefficient T-Statistic Tail Probability 
Constant 1.05 0.19 5.53 0.00 
Auction Number  -0.05 0.02 -2.59 0.02 
Adjusted R2 = 27.7%, F-statistic = 6.73 with tail probability of 0.021 
It is unclear why Retail Sales would be the only economic measure with a demonstrated 
improvement in auction forecast errors over time.  It is not the least volatile of the measures 
under consideration here – ISM manufacturing announcements exhibit a much smaller standard 
deviation relative to its mean.  There also does not appear to have been a predictable trend in the 
Retail Sales announcements over the period in question that might explain the improvements.   
Perhaps the improvement in Retail Sales forecasts over time is related to its position in 
the monthly cycle of data releases.  In a study of the impact of macroeconomic announcements 
on foreign exchange markets, Andersen et al (2003) found that releases which occur earlier in the 
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month tend to have a greater impact on markets than those that occur later in the month, 
presumably because later releases contain little “new” information.  In keeping with those 
findings, we might expect to see auctions for Retail Sales releases, which take place later in the 
month, generate more accurate predictions than those for Nonfarm Payrolls, which take place 
about a week earlier, and for the ISM index, which typically occurs the first or second day of the 
month.  Notwithstanding the improvement in Retail Sales predictions over time, however, this 
does not appear to be the case.  As noted in section III, above, ISM auctions generated the 
smallest mean absolute errors (0.21), followed by Retail Sales auctions (0.62) and, finally, by 
Nonfarm Payrolls (0.76).  A likely explanation for this unexpected result might be the impact of 
the so-called “jobless recovery” coming out of the 2001 recession.  Nonfarm Payroll auction 
participants may have made overly optimistic predictions after receiving good news about the 
expanding economy.   
VII. Conclusion 
The analysis in this paper showed that, on average, the implied market forecasts from the 
auctions were not significantly different than economists’ consensus forecasts, and the auction 
predictions did not embody expertise in judging the surprise in the forthcoming announcement.  
However, the data do seem to support a finding that the auctions produce less overly optimistic 
forecasts than economist consensus estimates.  It appears that market participants are more 
cautious when money is at risk than economists are when their reputation is at risk.  Finally, with 
the possible exception of Retail Sales announcements, the accuracy of the auction forecasts does 
not appear to have improved with time.   
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Appendix I – Sample Post Auction Reports 
 
 
(a) Post Auction Report. Change in US Non-farm Payrolls, November 2002 Report 
 
The first graph shows implied probabilities that are fairly symmetric based on opening 
prices. The second graph shows the evolution of the implied market forecast over the 
auction period with a sharp change in the implied forecast around 3:00 PM. The third 
graph shows the revised implied probabilities based on the closing option prices.  
 
 
(b) Post Auction Report. ISM Manufacturing PMI, November 2003 
 
The first graph shows implied probabilities based on opening prices. Note the symmetry 
in the graph and upturn for extreme high and low values. The second graph shows the 
revised implied probabilities based on closing option prices. These revised probabilities 
differ considerably from the first graph.  
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Appendix II – Data 
Event Release Period Release Date Auction Date
Auction Implied 
Market Forecast
Economist 
Consensus 
Forecast
Actual 
Announcement
ISM Oct-02 11/1/2002 10/31/2002 47.5 48.9 48.5
ISM Nov-02 12/2/2002 12/2/2002 51 51 49.2
ISM Jan-03 2/3/2003 1/31/2003 53.2 54 53.9
ISM Feb-03 3/3/2003 2/28/2003 52.2 52 50.5
ISM Mar-03 4/1/2003 3/31/2003 48.1 49 46.2
ISM Apr-03 5/1/2003 4/30/2003 47 47.2 45.4
ISM May-03 6/2/2003 5/30/2003 48.4 48.65 49.4
ISM Jun-03 7/1/2003 7/1/2003 51.2 51 49.8
ISM Jul-03 8/1/2003 7/31/2003 51.8 52 51.8
ISM Aug-03 9/2/2003 9/2/2003 54.4 54 54.7
ISM Sep-03 10/1/2003 10/1/2003 53.4 54.5 53.7
ISM Oct-03 11/3/2003 11/2/2003 56.2 56 57
ISM Nov-03 12/1/2003 12/1/2003 58.4 58.5 62.8
ISM Jan-04 2/2/2004 2/2/2004 64.6 64 63.6
ISM Feb-04 3/1/2004 3/1/2004 61.1 62 61.4
Retail Sales Oct-02 11/14/2002 11/13/2002 0.01 0.30 0.70
Retail Sales Nov-02 12/12/2002 12/11/2002 0.13 0.20 0.50
Retail Sales Dec-02 1/14/2003 1/13/2003 0.23 0.30 0.00
Retail Sales Jan-03 2/13/2003 2/12/2003 0.53 0.50 1.30
Retail Sales Feb-03 3/13/2003 3/12/2003 -0.21 -0.10 -1.00
Retail Sales Mar-03 4/11/2003 4/10/2003 0.41 0.40 1.10
Retail Sales Apr-03 5/14/2003 5/13/2003 -0.14 0.20 -0.90
Retail Sales May-03 6/12/2003 6/11/2003 0.17 0.20 0.10
Retail Sales Jun-03 7/15/2003 7/14/2003 0.16 0.30 0.70
Retail Sales Jul-03 8/13/2003 8/12/2003 0.63 0.60 0.80
Retail Sales Aug-03 9/12/2003 9/12/2003 0.82 0.80 0.70
Retail Sales Sep-03 10/15/2003 10/15/2003 0.57 0.40 0.30
Retail Sales Oct-03 11/14/2003 11/14/2003 0.09 0.20 0.20
Retail Sales Nov-03 12/11/2003 12/11/2003 0.32 0.30 0.40
Retail Sales Dec-03 1/15/2004 1/15/2004 0.41 0.40 0.10
Retail Sales Jan-04 2/12/2004 2/12/2004 0.6 0.50 0.90
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-02 10/4/2002 10/1/2002 -38 6 -43
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-02 10/4/2002 10/3/2002 -18 6 -43
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-02 11/1/2002 10/29/2002 -16 0 -5
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-02 11/1/2003 10/31/2002 -13 0 -5
Nonfarm Payroll Nov-02 12/6/2002 12/5/2002 70 35.5 -40
Nonfarm Payroll Dec-02 1/10/2003 1/9/2003 36 20 -101
Nonfarm Payroll Jan-03 2/7/2003 2/6/2003 59 68 143
Nonfarm Payroll Feb-03 3/7/2003 3/6/2003 -13 10 -308
Nonfarm Payroll Mar-03 4/3/2003 4/3/2003 -65 -35 -108
Nonfarm Payroll Apr-03 5/2/2003 5/1/2003 -119 -60 -48
Nonfarm Payroll May-03 6/6/2003 6/5/2003 -44 -30 -17
Nonfarm Payroll Jun-03 7/3/2003 7/2/2003 4 0 -30
Nonfarm Payroll Jul-03 8/1/2003 7/31/2003 17 10 -44
Nonfarm Payroll Aug-03 9/5/2003 9/4/2003 7 20 -93
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-03 10/3/2003 10/3/2003 -3 -25 57
Nonfarm Payroll Sep-03 10/3/2003 10/2/2003 -11 -25 57
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-03 11/7/2003 11/6/2003 86 65 126
Nonfarm Payroll Oct-03 11/7/2003 11/7/2003 88 65 126
Nonfarm Payroll Nov-03 12/5/2003 12/4/2003 151 150 57
Nonfarm Payroll Nov-03 12/5/2003 12/5/2003 160 150 57
Nonfarm Payroll Dec-03 1/9/2004 1/8/2004 181 150 1
Nonfarm Payroll Dec-03 1/9/2004 1/9/2004 162 150 1
Nonfarm Payroll Jan-04 2/6/2004 2/5/2004 167 175 112
Nonfarm Payroll Jan-04 2/6/2004 2/6/2004 174 175 112
Nonfarm Payroll Feb-04 3/6/2004 3/6/2004 130 130 21  
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